I have taken sometime to reflect on
President Goodluck Jonathan’s
presidential ambition, which became
an instant debate after the death of
his predecessor, Alhaji Umaru Musa
Yar’Adua and came to a conclusion
that it would have been very tragic,
if he did not contest, at all.
I had earlier queried the motive
behind his desire to seek power
after a fruitful political career and in
the face of mounting zoning
principle of his party that allegedly
did not favour him even when it
was clear that the zoning
arrangement lacked equity and had
no referendum basis.
An objective comparative analysis
with his predecessors has since
deposed to the fact that his
achievements barely 10 months ago
is the driving force and not personal
ambition. Many people have
commended his political deft
moves, indeed, his dexterity in
social and political engineering, high
sense of vision and mission,
humility and personal success
story, hardwork and dedication to
duty etc.
The Igbo must have had him in
mind when they averred that a
chick that would turn into a cock is
known the moment it is hatched.
Right from the day he took over as
President, he left nobody in doubt
that he was primed for selfless and
result oriented service. He was able
to identify the key areas that are
critical to the economic growth of
the nation.
Realising that it was better to build
strong institutions than strong
leaders, he reorganized the
Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) and appointed
Prof Attahiru Jega, as Chairman. He
followed it up by adequately funding
the electoral body and replacing key
officials identified to be members of
political parties. These actions, no
doubt, boosted the credibility of the
body and the confidence of
politicians in the INEC to conduct
free, fair and transparent elections.
TI want to single out the Presidential
Projects Assessment Committee
headed by Ibrahim Bunu and
Presidential Committee on Energy
and Power headed by Prof Barth
Nnaji. They are his catalysts and
vehicles he uses to draw, drive and
focus attention on critical areas of
governance to achieve planned
development after project execution.
Projects that were hitherto
abandoned are not only revived but
are either completed or ongoing.
Abuja Residents are particularly
applauding the speed at which the
expansion of Musa Yar’Dua
Expressway, Kubwa Expressway,
Akwanga-Lafia road, Lokoja-Abuja
road, the Millennium projects etc.
are going and wondering whether it
is not the same Nigerian contractors
that are handling them.
Interestingly, transportation and
agriculture are receiving attention.
Just a few days ago, the nation
erupted in joy as the rail transport
sector emerged. A train took off
from the Iddo (Lagos) terminal to
the North for the first time in 10
years. The dredging of River Niger
has been sustained with the
potential economic benefits.
Irrigation, provision of agricultural
loans and silos projects are ongoing
helping farmers to boost food
production.
The recent launch of gas revolution
agenda would raise domestic gas
supply to over 10 billion cubic feet
per day, as well as end gas flaring,
build petrochemical plants and
create jobs. That is the same zeal he
has brought to bear on the energy
sector. Since his emergence, power
supply has improved remarkably.
However, while some of his critics
may be quick to point out that as a
former lecturer, Jonathan is bound
to please his former constituency,
what about his reaching out to
Nigerian workers by signing into
law a bill for a new national
minimum wage of N18,000? What
about the $200 million he approved
to boost the entertainment industry
and gave our artistes a new lease of
life?
His willingness to sign the Freedom
of Information Bill? What about his
recent order that female cadets be
enlisted for combatant training at the
Nigeria Defense Academy ? What
about his resolve to implement the
affirmative action of ceding 35 per
cent of government appointments
to women? These measures, no
doubt, point to the fact that his
administration has a definite
purpose and direction and will
represent a system mindset which
is very fundamental to society
transformation.
• Prince Okwuaka is a pub

IS GEJA THE MESSIAH NIGERIANS NEED?

I have taken sometime to reflect on
President Goodluck Jonathan’s
presidential ambition, which became
an instant debate after the death of
his predecessor, Alhaji Umaru Musa
Yar’Adua and came to a conclusion
that it would have been very tragic,
if he did not contest, at all.
I had earlier queried the motive
behind his desire to seek power
after a fruitful political career and in
the face of mounting zoning
principle of his party that allegedly
did not favour him even when it
was clear that the zoning
arrangement lacked equity and had
no referendum basis.
An objective comparative analysis
with his predecessors has since
deposed to the fact that his
achievements barely 10 months ago
is the driving force and not personal
ambition. Many people have
commended his political deft
moves, indeed, his dexterity in
social and political engineering, high
sense of vision and mission,
humility and personal success
story, hardwork and dedication to
duty etc.
The Igbo must have had him in
mind when they averred that a
chick that would turn into a cock is
known the moment it is hatched.
Right from the day he took over as
President, he left nobody in doubt
that he was primed for selfless and
result oriented service. He was able
to identify the key areas that are
critical to the economic growth of
the nation.
Realising that it was better to build
strong institutions than strong
leaders, he reorganized the
Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) and appointed
Prof Attahiru Jega, as Chairman. He
followed it up by adequately funding
the electoral body and replacing key
officials identified to be members of
political parties. These actions, no
doubt, boosted the credibility of the
body and the confidence of
politicians in the INEC to conduct
free, fair and transparent elections.
TI want to single out the Presidential
Projects Assessment Committee
headed by Ibrahim Bunu and
Presidential Committee on Energy
and Power headed by Prof Barth
Nnaji. They are his catalysts and
vehicles he uses to draw, drive and
focus attention on critical areas of
governance to achieve planned
development after project execution.
Projects that were hitherto
abandoned are not only revived but
are either completed or ongoing.
Abuja Residents are particularly
applauding the speed at which the
expansion of Musa Yar’Dua
Expressway, Kubwa Expressway,
Akwanga-Lafia road, Lokoja-Abuja
road, the Millennium projects etc.
are going and wondering whether it
is not the same Nigerian contractors
that are handling them.
Interestingly, transportation and
agriculture are receiving attention.
Just a few days ago, the nation
erupted in joy as the rail transport
sector emerged. A train took off
from the Iddo (Lagos) terminal to
the North for the first time in 10
years. The dredging of River Niger
has been sustained with the
potential economic benefits.
Irrigation, provision of agricultural
loans and silos projects are ongoing
helping farmers to boost food
production.
The recent launch of gas revolution
agenda would raise domestic gas
supply to over 10 billion cubic feet
per day, as well as end gas flaring,
build petrochemical plants and
create jobs. That is the same zeal he
has brought to bear on the energy
sector. Since his emergence, power
supply has improved remarkably.
However, while some of his critics
may be quick to point out that as a
former lecturer, Jonathan is bound
to please his former constituency,
what about his reaching out to
Nigerian workers by signing into
law a bill for a new national
minimum wage of N18,000? What
about the $200 million he approved
to boost the entertainment industry
and gave our artistes a new lease of
life?
His willingness to sign the Freedom
of Information Bill? What about his
recent order that female cadets be
enlisted for combatant training at the
Nigeria Defense Academy ? What
about his resolve to implement the
affirmative action of ceding 35 per
cent of government appointments
to women? These measures, no
doubt, point to the fact that his
administration has a definite
purpose and direction and will
represent a system mindset which
is very fundamental to society
transformation.
• Prince Okwuaka is a public affai

The intelligence he gathered is
alleged to have been a significant
factor in Israel’s success in the
Six Day War.
The Special Branch Department
of the Nigerian Police was at its
height a pretty good service
nipping most threats to state
security in the bud either at the
planning stages or before they
became operational.
The Special Branch was so well
entrenched and pervasive that it
successfully infiltrated most
social, political and religious
organisations in the country
including Town unions, Churches,
mosques, political parties and
groups of interest to the state.
The assassination of Murtala
Mohammed in 1975 was the excuse
needed by the military to subjugate
the Special Branch Department
under the control of Military
Intelligence. In 1976, the Department
was excised out of the police and
merged with elements of Military
Intelligence to form the Nigerian
Security Organisation under then
Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed.
This singular action debilitated the
police of its ability to engage in
serious security and political
intelligence gathering. The NSO did
not fare better either because the
efficiency of the Special Branch
officers were subsumed under the
leadership of officers from the
Directorate of Military intelligence.
The result was a service that relied
less on pain-staking detective work,
worked blind most times such as
the failure to detect the Maitasine
rebellion and emphasized executive
protection and the overwhelming
use of force in reaction to national
security threats.
Whether in Zaki-Biam, Odi, the
Niger-Delta or in the Boko-Haram
stronghold of Borno, a cursory look
at the operational style of the
security services would show that
there is a distinct over-reliance on
crushing force which at the end of
the day serves no strategic purpose
as the absence of good actionable
intelligence only results in the
destruction of local infrastructure by
the security forces while the
operational masterminds behind the
assault on the state and its agents
remain at large only to respond
viciously o the state’ brutal actions
months or years later.
The Nigerian Police requires a total,
comprehensive overhaul of its
operational infrastructure, assets
and style. There is an urgent need to
re-invigorate the Intelligence and
Investigative Bureaus of the police
both at the national and local levels.
There is need to return to the
halcyon days of the Special Branch.
|
The FIIB and the various SIIB’s are
manifestly deficient in handling
political and security intelligence, I
recommend that assets be deployed
from the Department of State
Services to manage the
administrative functions and
operational acvities of the FIIB and
the SIIB’s for a period of 10 years to
allow for the efficient capability of
the Bureau to undertake security
intelligence operations as well as
train police officers attached to the
Bureau to appreciate the nuances of
political and security intelligence
operations.
This move will also encourage an
environment that promotes
investigative, operational style
tempered with analytical curiosity
which the police no doubt lack. I
note however that the problem of
encouraging intelligence analysis
and imaginative, critical thinking is a
problem all the security services in
the country have as a result of their
history and environment especially
the military years which geared
them towards internal security,
criminal investigation, and anti-
subversive activities.
Furthermore, there is an imperative
to interrogate the method of
appointing the leadership of the
Nigerian police Force. The pertinent
questions to ask include; must the
Federal or state police chiefs be
police officers? Can the ventilation
and assimilation of new ideas and
new paradigms on effective policing
be guaranteed by someone who
has been bureaucratized in the
system for over thirty years? What
is wrong with an officer of the
National intelligence Agency or the
Department of State Services or a
serving or retired judge heading the
police force? Wouldn’t the adoption
of external leadership from outside
the police assist the force appreciate
better he limitations in the way it
operates, makes use of the product
of its operations and in evaluating
whether the operations themselves
are really worthwhile.
The questions are by no means
exhaustive. I posit that the
institutionalization of the leadership
of the police within its calcified
bureaucracy has done more harm
than good. In addition the Nigerian
Police Force needs to be situated
within the context of contemporary
modern policing methods that
emphasize the use of science and
technology to reach acceptable
judicial conclusions. At the last
count, the force had only a sole
forensic laboratory in Lagos that
lacks the basic functionalities of a
serious police lab. The Jonathan
administration needs to ensure that
each state police command owns its
own forensic lab while extensive
training of police officers in science
based evidence gathering should be
undertaken as a matter of urgent
national importance.
With no coherent counter-terrorism
strategy, there is need for the Office
of the National Security Adviser and
the office of the Coordinator on
Counter-terrorism to adopt a
strategy that places the assets and
capabilities of the Military at the heart
of this strategy in order to effectively
confront the challenges posed by
nihilist counter-state actors. The
intelligence corps of the Army, Air
Force and Navy has as a result of
long years of military rule been
better trained and better
infrastructured to challenge counter-
state activities.
Intelligence is the key to national
security. It was strategic intelligence
planning and operations that led to
the assassination of Osama bin
Laden and hundreds of Al-Qaeda
operatives and commanders across
the globe. It is proper intelligence
that has allowed the state of Israel to
terminate without prejudice those
who threaten its survival. It is good
intelligence not heavy handed
response that will secure peace for
Nigeria

The intelligence he gathered is
alleged to have been a significant
factor in Israel’s success in the
Six Day War.
The Special Branch Department
of the Nigerian Police was at its
height a pretty good service
nipping most threats to state
security in the bud either at the
planning stages or before they
became operational.
The Special Branch was so well
entrenched and pervasive that it
successfully infiltrated most
social, political and religious
organisations in the country
including Town unions, Churches,
mosques, political parties and
groups of interest to the state.
The assassination of Murtala
Mohammed in 1975 was the excuse
needed by the military to subjugate
the Special Branch Department
under the control of Military
Intelligence. In 1976, the Department
was excised out of the police and
merged with elements of Military
Intelligence to form the Nigerian
Security Organisation under then
Colonel Abdullahi Mohammed.
This singular action debilitated the
police of its ability to engage in
serious security and political
intelligence gathering. The NSO did
not fare better either because the
efficiency of the Special Branch
officers were subsumed under the
leadership of officers from the
Directorate of Military intelligence.
The result was a service that relied
less on pain-staking detective work,
worked blind most times such as
the failure to detect the Maitasine
rebellion and emphasized executive
protection and the overwhelming
use of force in reaction to national
security threats.
Whether in Zaki-Biam, Odi, the
Niger-Delta or in the Boko-Haram
stronghold of Borno, a cursory look
at the operational style of the
security services would show that
there is a distinct over-reliance on
crushing force which at the end of
the day serves no strategic purpose
as the absence of good actionable
intelligence only results in the
destruction of local infrastructure by
the security forces while the
operational masterminds behind the
assault on the state and its agents
remain at large only to respond
viciously o the state’ brutal actions
months or years later.
The Nigerian Police requires a total,
comprehensive overhaul of its
operational infrastructure, assets
and style. There is an urgent need to
re-invigorate the Intelligence and
Investigative Bureaus of the police
both at the national and local levels.
There is need to return to the
halcyon days of the Special Branch.
|
The FIIB and the various SIIB’s are
manifestly deficient in handling
political and security intelligence, I
recommend that assets be deployed
from the Department of State
Services to manage the
administrative functions and
operational acvities of the FIIB and
the SIIB’s for a period of 10 years to
allow for the efficient capability of
the Bureau to undertake security
intelligence operations as well as
train police officers attached to the
Bureau to appreciate the nuances of
political and security intelligence
operations.
This move will also encourage an
environment that promotes
investigative, operational style
tempered with analytical curiosity
which the police no doubt lack. I
note however that the problem of
encouraging intelligence analysis
and imaginative, critical thinking is a
problem all the security services in
the country have as a result of their
history and environment especially
the military years which geared
them towards internal security,
criminal investigation, and anti-
subversive activities.
Furthermore, there is an imperative
to interrogate the method of
appointing the leadership of the
Nigerian police Force. The pertinent
questions to ask include; must the
Federal or state police chiefs be
police officers? Can the ventilation
and assimilation of new ideas and
new paradigms on effective policing
be guaranteed by someone who
has been bureaucratized in the
system for over thirty years? What
is wrong with an officer of the
National intelligence Agency or the
Department of State Services or a
serving or retired judge heading the
police force? Wouldn’t the adoption
of external leadership from outside
the police assist the force appreciate
better he limitations in the way it
operates, makes use of the product
of its operations and in evaluating
whether the operations themselves
are really worthwhile.
The questions are by no means
exhaustive. I posit that the
institutionalization of the leadership
of the police within its calcified
bureaucracy has done more harm
than good. In addition the Nigerian
Police Force needs to be situated
within the context of contemporary
modern policing methods that
emphasize the use of science and
technology to reach acceptable
judicial conclusions. At the last
count, the force had only a sole
forensic laboratory in Lagos that
lacks the basic functionalities of a
serious police lab. The Jonathan
administration needs to ensure that
each state police command owns its
own forensic lab while extensive
training of police officers in science
based evidence gathering should be
undertaken as a matter of urgent
national importance.
With no coherent counter-terrorism
strategy, there is need for the Office
of the National Security Adviser and
the office of the Coordinator on
Counter-terrorism to adopt a
strategy that places the assets and
capabilities of the Military at the heart
of this strategy in order to effectively
confront the challenges posed by
nihilist counter-state actors. The
intelligence corps of the Army, Air
Force and Navy has as a result of
long years of military rule been
better trained and better
infrastructured to challenge counter-
state activities.
Intelligence is the key to national
security. It was strategic intelligence
planning and operations that led to
the assassination of Osama bin
Laden and hundreds of Al-Qaeda
operatives and commanders across
the globe. It is proper intelligence
that has allowed the state of Israel to
terminate without prejudice those
who threaten its survival. It is good
intelligence not heavy handed
response that will secure peace for
Nigeria

The Nigerian Civil War......

The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt By Major Abubakar A. Atofarati: CSC 1992 Student: US Marine Command & Staff College(Academic Year 1991/92) 1. Outline. 2. Introduction. 3. Executive Summary. 4. Background History of Nigeria. 5. History of the Nigerian Army before 1966. 6. The War - Planning Strategies. 7. The Clash of Arms. 8. Lessons Learnt. 9. Conclusion. 10. Bibliography. OUTLINE The Nigerian Civil War was fought to reintegrate and reunify the country. This paper will focus on the causes of the war, strategies employed by the belligerents in the conflict, and the lessons learnt. INTRODUCTION The Federation of Nigeria, as it is known today, has never really been one homogeneous country, for it's widely differing peoples and tribes. This obvious fact notwithstanding, the former colonial master decided to keep the country one in order to effectively control her vital resources for their economic interests. Thus, for administrative convenience the Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in 1914. Thereafter the only thing this people had in common was the name of their country since each side had different administrative set - up.This alone was an insufficient basis for true unity. Under normal circumstances the amagalmation ought to have brought the various peoples together and provided a firm basis for the arduous task of establishing closer cultural, social, religious, and linguistic ties vital for true unity among the people. There was division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced disparity in development. The growth of nationalism in the society and the subsequent emergence of political parties were based on ethnic/tribal rather than national interests, and therefore had no unifying effect on the peoples against the colonial master. Rather, it was the people themselves who were the victims of the political struggles which were supposed to be aimed at removing foreign domination. At independence Nigeria became a Federation and remained one country. Soon afterwards the battle to consolidate the legacy of political and military dominance of a section of Nigeria over the rest of the Federation began with increased intensity. It is this struggle that eventually degenerated into coup, counter coup and a bloody civil war. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Nigerian Civil War broke out on 6 July 1967. The war was the culmination of an uneasy peace and stability that had plagued the Nation from independence in 1960. This situation had its genesis in the geography, history, culture and demography of Nigeria. The immediate cause of the civil war itself may be identified as the coup and the counter coup of 1966 which altered the political equation and destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups. As a means of holding the country together in the last result, the country was divided into twelve states from the original four regions in May 1967. The former Eastern Region under Lt. Col. Ojukwu saw the act of the creation of states by decree "without consultation" as the last straw, and declared the Region an independent state of "Biafra". The Federal Government in Lagos saw this as an act of secession and illegal. Several meetings were held to resolve the issue peacefully without success. To avoid disintegration of the country, the central government was left with only one choice of bringing back the Region to the main fold by force. The Federal side expected a quick victory while the Biafrans saw the war as that of survival and were ready to fight to the last man. By August 1967, the war had been extended to the Mid - Western Region by the Biafrans with the aim to relief pressure on the northern front and to threaten the Federal Capital, Lagos. Both sides employed Political, Diplomatic, Psychological and Military strategies to prosecute the war. By the end of April 1969, after almost two years of bloody and destructive war, the envisioned quick victory had eluded the Federal side, the rebel enclave had been drastically reduced in size but the Biafrans were still holding on. More peace conferences were held but none achieved a cease - fire and an end to the war. The Federals embarked on a strategic envelopment of the remaining Biafran enclave. By the Christmas of 1969, it was obvious that the end of the civil war was near. The self - acclaimed Head of State of Biafra, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, realizing the hopelessness of the situation fled the enclave with his immediate family members on the 10th of January 1970. The Commander of the Biafran Army who took over the administration of the remaining enclave surrendered to the Federal Government on 14th January 1970 bringing an end to the war, secessionist attempt and bloodshed. Several lessons were learnt from the war and these have helped in the unification, political, military and economical progress of the country. THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR CAUSES, STRATEGIES AND LESSONS LEARNT The Nigerian civil war, popularly known all over the world as the "Biafran War" was fought from 2 July 1967 to 15 January 1970. The war was between the then Eastern Region of Nigeria and the rest of the country. The Eastern Region declared itself an independent state which was regarded as an act of secession by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The war was fought to reunify the country. In order to understand what led to the civil war,

It might be too soon to pronounce either a favourable or unfavourable verdict on the overall performance of INEC as the impartial umpire of Nigeria’s most complex elections ever. The true test of the process, as an expression of grassroots political sentiment, is still to come. The elections of members of state Houses of Assembly and state Governors will take place at the end of this week. These should have come before the Federal polls if the process was chronologically scheduled. The National Assembly deliberately reversed the order of elections to suit its members purposes when they amended the Electoral Act. This is an example of how legitimacy can unseat natural justice. There is nothing that the public can do to change it. No political institution has the power to force a public referendum on the issue. In spite of this it cannot be denied that Professor Attahiru Jega has overseen an unprecedentedly transparent and refreshingly credible process. The ongoing development of the methodology of electioneering illustrated by the conduct of both of the exercises that have taken place so far suggests that Prof. Jega’s INEC will end the journey on a high note. The forthcoming polls will arguably be the most challenging in the series. The number of candidates to be elected is far more than that of the previous polls. The issues and sentiments that are deployed in state elections are often volatile because they are locally focused. For these and other reasons INEC will have to exercise increased vigilance over the process and undertake much more collaboration with local participants in the conduct of its duties. This will test the durability and relevance of the process to its limit and it is only when the exercise has been concluded that the full impact of the Jega-led transformation of the electoral process in Nigeria can be adequately judged. Nonetheless the conduct of last week’s Presidential election must be commended for its impeccable adherence to the formal processes of competition. These processes have resulted in an incontrovertible triumph for Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. Only those who are driven by personal disappointment over the failure of their candidates would argue that the outcome does not represent the true shape of the electoral will of the nation. The challengers themselves must be aware of the veracity of the final result. The refusal of Gen. Buhari to concede defeat as soon as it was clear what the voting trend was does no justice to his claims of integrity and fairness. His search for evidence to justify his claim of endemic irregularities cannot be justified. It is hardly likely that the exercise could have gone off quite as smoothly as it did, in spite of pockets of violence and some reports of attempts to violate the regulations, if widespread rigging had been attempted. Prof. Jega’s use of the NYSC members as the core of the INEC team on the ground was innovative and credible. His deployment of highly respected neutral academics as the bulk of the chairmen of collating teams was commendable. If Prof. Jega’s methods were influenced by any of Dr. Jonathan’s wishes it seems to have been the President’s consistent call for a free and fair contest. In the process of delivering the results Prof. Jega’s assertion that as the returning officer he should be seen to be impartial to a fault caused reporting of the results to become boring. The TV screens were filled with silence as he calculated results in full public view even though they had been reported accurately in the print media several hours earlier. In spite of the tedium when the official result was eventually declared it clearly represented the general expectations of most Nigerians and this has set the bar for future exercises. It is not INEC’s duty to either pronounce guidelines for political alliances or to encourage political consensus. It is its central task however to ensure that the atmosphere exists within which the true political wishes of the majority of the public can be expressed through the ballot. In some areas of Nigeria during these recent contests it has become obvious that the non- partisan impulses of the electorate are on the ascendancy. In certain states while the PDP has been rejected thoroughly at the National Assembly polls the support for the party’s candidate Dr. Jonathan in the presidential election was equally strong. This suggests that when the Jonathan Presidency is eventually consolidated, following state elections and the inauguration of his new term in office, the impulse towards reconciliation of public views will be of paramount importance in setting the tone of the political future. INEC should work diligently to study how its machinery performed in these polls in order to create a process that will overcome and prevent violations of public contest in the future. However, as the aftermath of the Presidential polls is already indicating, the most important factor for survival of the democratic process might not be INEC’s conduct of the elections but rather the conduct of the electorate. The governing authorities need to be ready to anticipate and contain public disenchantment manifested by those who have lost. This is an equally important factor that must be taken into consideration in the management of Nigeria’s democratic space in the future since it is clear that there is a fundamental regional political divide in the nation. It is not INEC’s duty to prevent the devastation that this division in the polity can cau