Niger Delta militants and the Boko Haram: Complex contrast

VANGUARD of July 20, 2011
ex pounded on its front page
headline: “Reps afraid to
discuss Boko Haram” as
follows:”The fear of a possible
reprisal attack against them
or members of their families
has kept members of the
House of Representatives
from discussing the growing
menace of the Boko Haram
sect which has been engaged
in violent confrontations with
security forces in Borno and
other Northern states of the
federation, Vanguard
investigations have revealed”.
Prior to this report, two
governors have publicly
apologised to the sect, thus
fulfilling one of the conditions
for peace stipulated by the
sect. Government on its own
has taken a placatory step by
ordering the prosecution of
the members of the Police
Force accused of extra-legal
killing of the leader of the
Boko Haram sect while he
was under the custody of the
Nigeria Police.
These happenings point to a
remarkable difference
between the government’s
perception of the threat
posed by the Niger Delta
insurgency and that posed
by the Boko Haram sect. That
difference is captured in the
deployment of amnesty as
the solution acceptable to
government in resolving the
Niger Delta conflicts and a
genuflective deference to the
Boko Haram as the solution
canvassed by government
for reconciliation with the
sect.
What does this difference in
methods suggest as to the
security of the Federal
Government? Amnesty
implies a “take it or leave it”
approach- a tough “your last
chance” option. On the other
hand government’s approach
to the threat posed by the
sect appears reactive, rather
than proactive.
Why? My take on
government’s Boko Haram
diplomacy? The sect has
opted for war and its policy is
to kill, kill and kill and that by
any means that gets the
killing going. What is the
primary enemy of the sect?
The security forces of the
government. The Niger Delta
militants’ strategy on the
other hand was largely to
disrupt the operations of the
oil and gas companies in
order to extract concessions.
The Niger Delta militants from
my perspective were not
insurgents and did not pose a
threat of insurgency to
government; at its best, their
demands were for a just
treatment of the Niger Delta,
the cash-flow of the entire
economy.
The Boko Haram politics on
the other hand is
insurrectional, and is a threat
that is infinitely greater than
that of the Niger Delta. The
sect by its politics has staked
its claim as a primary state
power interest group. In so
doing it has decided that it
can at will use force to
implement its purpose and
resolving its conflict.
Not even the PDP has been
that presumptuous as to
contest with the Armed
Forces the independent use
of force to effect its political
purpose. It still seeks the way
of elections to assume
power.
When members of the
National Assembly
acknowledge their fear of
addressing the security
challenge posed by the sect
they also explicitly declare
their subjection to the sect.
That statement that they are
afraid to discuss the security
threat of the Boko Haram sect
transforms the Boko Haram
into a state power party.
All that is needed for their
insurrection to turn into full
scale insurgency is a shift in
interest, a shift from
intimidation and vengefulness
to interest in ruling the
country as a party of
dominion. Is the
government’s appreciation of
the sect different from my
own “bloody civilian” analysis
of our country’s security
politics? And should it be?